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SUMMARY: This case returns to the Court following remand for ________...____ 
reconsideration in light of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 
(1982). The United States challenges the CA's holdings that (1) the 
investigative detention of resps was unlawfully prolonged and (2) the 
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possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it, in violation of 
' 21 u.s.c. §84l(a) (1). 
On the morning of June 9, 1978,v6EA agent Cooke was on patrol in 
an unmarked vehicle near Su~set Beach, North Carolina. The area was 
under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approimately 
6:30a.m., the agent noticed a blue pickup, with an attached camper 
shell, traveling on the highway in tandem with a blue Pontiac. Resp 
Savage was driving the pickup, and resp Sharpe was driving the 
Pontiac. Cooke noticed that the truck was riding low in the rear and 
concluded that it was overloaded. After following the two vehicles 
for 21 miles, he decided to make an "investigative stop" and radioed 
the State Highway Patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher responded 
to the call, and the police, in separate vehicles, followed the 
Pontiac and the pickup off the highway, through a campground, and back 
I onto the highway. At certain times, Sharpe and Savage ~ceeded the 
speed limit. Once back on the highway, Thrasher signalled the Pontiac 
to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the right lane, the pickup 
y/truck cut between the Pontiac and Thrasher's patrol car, nearly 
hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway. 
Cooke stayed with the Pontiac. At the agent's request, Sharpe 
produced a Georgia driver's license, bearing the name of Raymond 
Pavlovich. After~ng unable to make radio contact with Thrasher, 
Cooke radioed local police to hold Sharpe while he went after Thrasher 
and the pickup. Until Cooke returned, Sharpe was held for 30-40 
minutes. 
Meanwhile, Thrasher chased and stopped Savage about one-half mile 
down the road. After patting him down, the officer asked Savage for a 





told Savage that he was not free to leave and could be held on 
speeding charges. Agent Cooke arrived approximately 15-20 minutes 
later and sought permission to search the truck. When Savage denied 
permission, the officer stepped on the rear of the truck and, noting 
that it did not move, confirmed his suspicion that it was heavily 
loaded. He then put his nose against the rear window (which was ~~ 
covered by a curtain) and reported that he could smell marijuan~ ~~ - -·--- -
agent took the truck keys out of the ignition, opened the rear of the 
camper and observed several large burlap-wrapped bales. Cooke 
arrested Savage and returned to Sharpe and arrested him. 
Later DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building in 
Charleston, South Carolina. Cooke ordered the bales removed, and ,, 
'' without a search warrant had eight randomly selected bales "sampled." 
Chemical tests showed that the baled substance was marijuana. ----The DC denied resps' motions to suppress the contraband. A 
divided CA reversed resps' convictions. The majority assumed that 
Cooke "had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that [resps] were 
engaged in marijuana trafficking when he and Thrasher stopped the 
Pontiac and the truck." But the court held the investigative stops of 
resps unlawful because they "failed to meet the requirement of 
brevity" thought to govern such detention on less than probable cause. 
I 
In effect, the l~ngth of detention transformed the stops into de facto 
arrests without probable cause. Consequently, the marijuana seized 
......... - ...... 
from the truck should have been suppressed. 
Alternatively, the majority held that the warrantless search of 
the eight bales in government possession violated the Fourth 
Amendment. ---
i 
an investigatory stop invariably depended on the length of the 
detention. Instead, a reviewing court should look to the totality of 
the circumstances justifying the detention. Because the detention in 
the present case was due not to the agent's actions, but to the 
resps', the detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Judge 
Russell also concluded that the search of the bales did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
The United States petitioned for cert., presenting three 
questions for review: whether the investigative detention of resps was 
unlawfully prolonged; whether the marijuana found in the pickup truck 
was correctly found to be a fruit of any unlawful detention; and 
whether the warrantless search of the bales was itself unlawful. This 
Court granted the petn, vacated the judgment of the CA, and remanded 
the case for consideration in light of the intervening decision in 
United States v.~ss, 456 u.s. 798 (1982). Justice Stevens, joined 
by Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the ground that the 
"issue in this case is whether a warrantelss search was itself 
legitimate ...• Our opinion in United States v. Ross sheds no light on 
the proper disposition of the case " 
On remand, a d~ided CA again reversed the convictions. The 
~ 
majority concluded that, in light of Ross, it was required to 
"disavow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrantless search 
of the marijuana bales. But "[f]indig that Ross does not adversely 
affect our primary holding that the initial stop of the vehicle and 
the lengthy detention of the two defendants constituted illegal 
seizures," the court readopted the prior opinion as modified. The 
majority declined to reconsider its "principal holding or to reargue 
the same issues that were addressed in detail in the original majority 
i 
I 
··~ .a. - -- -
Court's mandate. 
Judge Russell again dissented. Joined by Judges Widener, Hall 
and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of rehearing of an en bane 
hearing. In his view this Court's remand required the court to 
reconsider its conclusion that the detention of resps was unlawfully 
prolonged. Addressing the issue, he urged that the court's adherence 
to its prior decision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account resps' 
responsibility for the circumstances that prolonged their detention. 
CONTENTIONS: The Government maintains once again that the 
~ecision below is inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 u.s. 692, 
700-701 (1981) , in which the Court noted that the "exception for 
limited intrusions that may be justified by special law enforcement 
interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street detention 
accompanied by a frisk for weapons Therefore, in order to decide 
~ whether this case is controlled by the general rule, it is necessary 
to examine both the character of the official intrusion and its 
justification." Moreover, "[i]f the purpose underlying a Terry stop 
-- investigating possible criminal activity -- is to be served, the 
police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the 
individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry 
[ v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1968)], and Adams [v. Williams, 407 u.s. 143 
(1972)]." Id. at 700 n. 12. In Summers, the Court upheld the 
detention of the occupants of a house while the police executed a 
search warrant for the house. The Court's recent decision in United 
y/ States v. Place, No. 81-1617 (June 20, 1983), reaffirms the principles 
enunciated in Summers. Although the Court held that "on the facts 
presented" the 90-minute investigative detention in Place was unduly 
.· 
longer than the momentary ones involved in Terry, Adams, and [United 
States v.] Brignoni-Ponce [422 u.s. 873 (1975)]". While the Court 
recognized that "the brevity of the invasion of the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining 
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on 
reasonable suspicion," the Court "decline[d] to adopt any outside time 
limitation for a permissible Terry stop." Similarly, Circuit courts 
have upheld brief, but longer than momentary, detentions of suspects 
while they pursue their investigation. See, e.g., United States v. 
Short, 570 F.2d 1051, 1054-1055 (CADC 1978) (holding it permissible 
for police to detain a burglary suspect, whom they lacked probable 
cause to arrest, for purpose of transporting the suspect to the scene 
of the burglary for possible identification by the victim): United 
States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 389 (CA9) (permitting police to 
detain a person suspected of smuggling firearms for the period 
necessary to obtain the presence of a law enforcement officer with 
specific expertise in conducting investigations of such offenses), 
cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1023 (1976). The decision of the CA conflicts 
with the teaching of this Court and the other CAs. 
Even if the CA were correct in concluding that the duration of 
the detentions rerdered the seizure~f resps' unreasonable under the 
~<:::_ \ 
Fourth Amendment, it erred in holding that the marijuana discovered in 
Savage's pickup truck was a suppressible fuit of the improper duration 
of the detention. In this case, the discovery of the marijuana in the 
pickup did not in any meaningful way result from the fact that resps' 
detentions were extended beyond a couple of minutes. 
In a letter to Al Stevas, response has been waived. The letter 




with the "law of the case" doctrine. The letter also suggests that 
the government did not raise the fruits question in the court below 
and should not be able to present it for the first time in this Court. 
DISCUSSION: While Summers is not directly on point, the 
reasoning in that case suggests that a suspect may be detained briefly 
while police pursue a legitimate investigation. In the present case, 
Sharpe's 30-40 minute detention was necessary to find out what 
happened to Savage. And Savage's 15-20 minute detention was necessary 
to allow the DEA agent, who presumably had expertise in detecting the 
presence of drugs, to arrive for and pursue his investigation of the 
truck. The CA reasoned that "the length of the detentions effectively 
----~--
transformed them into 1~e facto arrests." But if the two vehicles had 
~
stopped together as apparently requested, only a short {1-2 minute) 
and certainly permissible delay would have occurred. The longer 
I delays by the law enforcement officers were "graduate[d] ... responses 
to the demands of [the] particular situation," United States v. Place, 
supra, slip op. at 13 n. 10, and in my view satisfied the Fourth 
Amendment's standard of reasonableness. The CA's fruits analysis also 
seems questionable, but it is unclear that the government raised the 
issue below. It would be necessary to call for the record to decide 
whether the issue were certworthy. 
v/ I recommend CFR with an view toward granting and possibly 
reversing summarily. A GVR in light of Summers and Place does not 
seem appropriate. This Court already GVRed once previously, and 
although this Court's order directed the CA to reconsider its opinion 
in light of Ross, implicit in that order was an invitation to 
reconsider, if not withdraw, the alternative ground raised for a 
second time here. As Judge Russell noted, three Justices dissented 
. . . , 
address this alternative ground. The majority did not agree and 
demonstrated by their disposi on that they did not feel that the 
alternative ground now befo e the Court provided any basis for 
reversing the convictio If that is a correct reading of the 




Response has been waived • 
November 15, 1983 Lieb Op'ns in pet'n 
.. 
No. 83-529 United States v. Sharpe 
I believe you called for a response in this case. The 
response is now in. It argues that consideration of the 
lawfulness of the prolonged detention is foreclosed by the fact 
that this Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Ross. 
~oss did not affect that holding and "it is improbable that this 
Court granted certiorari ••• and disapproved of the Fourth 
Circuit's handling of the Terry issue through a silent and 
implicit reprimand." It is true that the Court's instructions on 
remand suggested that only one of two alternative ho~dings needed 
to be examined. But that would be a rather senseless reading. 
In any case, the Court granted cert. on all questions presented 
by the Gov't and vacated the entire opinion. So technically 
~ consideration of the question now presented is not barred by law 
of the case. 
In addition to several other arguments that are not 
particularly important, resps argue that CA4 did not reach 
several arguments which might provide the basis for reversal no 
matter what happens to the question presented now. In 
particular, the court did not reach the question of whether there 
was particularized suspicion under Terry for the initial stop, 
and in fact expressed skepticism about the government's 
destruction of the evidence without permission of the DC. 
RECOMMENDATION: Nothing in the response changes anything. 
On further reflection, it seems like this is just an applicati~ 
of the 4th Amendment's reasonableness criteria to the facts of tl~ 
this case. CA4 simply found that the detention was longer than~fJ 
reasonably necessary. That might have been wrong, but the ~ 
question does not seem to warrant this Court's even summar~~::::r 
nttPntion . nF.NV _ 
'l 
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From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: MAY 0 4 1984 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE AND 
DONALD DAVIS SAVAGE 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No. 83-529. Decided May-, 1984 
PER CURIAM. 
On the morning of June 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration was on patrol in an unmarked 
vehicle near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an area under 
surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approxi-
mat~ly 6:30 a. m., Cooke noticed a blue pickup truck, with an 
attached camper shell, traveling on the highway in tandem 
with a blue Pontiac. Respondent Savage was driving the 
pickup, and respondent Sharpe was driving the Pontiac. 
Agent Cooke noticed that the truck was riding low in the rear 
and concluded that it was overloaded. A quilted material 
covered the rear window of the camper. 
Agent Cooke was sufficiently concerned to follow the two 
vehicles for 21 miles; he then decided to make an "investiga-
tive stop" and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assist-
ance. Officer Thrasher in a marked patrol car responded to 
the call, and both he and Agent Cooke, in separate vehicles, 
followed the Pontiac and the pickup off the highway, through 
a campground, and back onto the highway. At certain 
times, the Pontiac and the pickup exceeded the speed limit. 
Once back on the highway, Thrasher signalled the driver of 
the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the 
right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and 
Thrasher's patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and con-
tinued down the highway. 
Agent Cooke stayed with the Pontiac, which had stopped 
at the side of the road. At the agent's request, Sharpe pro-
duced a Georgia driver's license bearing the name of Ray-
;.. 
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mond Pavlovich. Mter being unable to make radio contact 
with Thrasher, Cooke radioed local police to come and hold 
Sharpe while he went after Thrasher and the pickup. The 
local police arrived and held Sharpe for 30 to 40 minutes until 
Cooke returned. 
Meanwhile, Thrasher chased the pickup and stopped it 
about one-half mile down the road. Mter patting down the 
driver, Thrasher asked him for a driver's license. The 
driver, Savage, produced his own Florida driver's license and 
a bill of sale for the truck bearing the name Pavlovich. 
Thrasher told Savage that he was not free to leave and could 
be held on speeding charges. Agent Cooke arrived at the 
scene approximately 15 minutes later and sought permission 
to search the pickup. When Savage denied permission, · 
Cooke stepped on the rear of the truck and, noting that it had 
not moved, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably over-
loaded. He then put his nose against the rear window, 
which was covered by a curtain, and reported t~at he could 
smell marihuana. The agent removed the keys from the ig-
nition, opened the rear of the camper, and observed several 
large burlap-wrapped bales. Cooke arrested Savage andre-
turned to arrest Sharpe. 
Later DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building 
in Charleston, South Carolina. Cooke ordered the bales re-
moved and, without a search warrant, had 8 randomly se-
lected bales sampled. As suspected, chemical tests showed 
that the baled substance was marihuana. 
Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession with in-
tent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 
U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. § 2. The United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina denied re-
spondents' motion to suppress the contraband, and respond-
ents were convicted. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit r~ctions. 660 F. 2d 967 (1981). The 
. . 
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majority assumed that Cooke "had an articulable and reason-
able suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in mari- · 
juana trafficking when he and Thrasher stopped the Pontiac 
and the truck." I d., at 970. But the 'COurt held the investi-
gative stops unlawful because they "failed to meet the re-
quirement of brevity" governing such detention on less than 
probable cause. Ibid. Alternatively, the majority held that 
the warrantless search of the bales in government possession 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that 
on either ground the marihuana should have been sup-
pressed. Judge Russell dissented. 
The Government petitioned for certiorari, asking this 
Court to review both of the alternative grounds held by the 
Court of Appeals to justify suppression. 1 We granted the 
petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and 
remanded the case for consideration in light of the interven-
ing decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). 
457 u. s. 1127 (1982). 2 
On remand, a divided f the Court 
reversed the convictions. 712 F. 2d 65 (1983). The major-
ity concluded that, in light of Ross, it was required to "dis-
avow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrantless 
search of the marihuana bales. But, "[f]inding that Ross 
does not adversely affect our primary holding that the initial 
stop of the vehicle and the lengthy detention of the two de-
fendants constituted illegal seizures," the court readopted 
the prior opinion as modified. The majority declined to re-
consider its "principal holding or to reargue the same issues 
' The Government also asked this Court to review the Court of Appeals' 
holding that the marihuana was a fruit of respondents' unlawful detention. 
2 JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICES BRENNAN and MARSHALL, dis-
sented, stating: 
''We held [in Ross] that the scope of a legitimate warrantless search of an 
automobile is defined by the object of the search and the places in which 
there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. The issue pre-
sented in this case is whether a warrantless search was itself legitimate." 
Id., at 1128. 
4 UNITED STATES v. SHARPE 
that were addressed in detail in the original majority and dis-
senting opinions," reasoning that its action complied with this 
Court's mandate. The panel assumed that "(h]ad [this] 
Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would 
have said so." I d., at 65, n. 1. 
Judge Russell again dissented. Joined by Judges Wid-
ener, Hall and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of en 
bane hearing. In his view, this Court's remand required the 
court to reconsider its conclusion that the detention of re-
spondents was unlawfully prolonged. Addressing the issue, 
he urged that the Court of Appeals' adherence to its prior de-
cision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 
692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account re-
spondents~ responsibility for the circumstances that pro-
longed their detention. 712 F. 2d, at 67-69. 
The rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, "it 
must be affirmed, illfiough thelower court relied upon a . ---- -----wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." Helvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Therefore, had we con-
cluded that one ground for the decision below was infirm 
under Ross but that the alternative ground at issue here ade-
quately supported the judgment, we would simply have de-
nied the petition for certiorari. Instead, we vacated the first 
panel decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case 
to that court. Our disp2sjt~n woul~av~b~n__eoinj;less if f 
we did not want,!he .Q_ou~f Appg_~to r con..siderJ!le mer-
itso f the issues now before the Court. The Court of A eals 
---.....-\__ has railed to onor o uran=ection. Implicit in our order was 
./ the direction to recons1 er, 1 not withdraw, the Court of Ap-
peals' alternative holding that the prolonged detention of the 
1 
respondents violated the Fourth Amendment. By refusing 
to reconsider this alternative holding, the Court of Appeals 
misapprehended and failed ~ o r or~r. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " The 
UNITED STATES v. SHARPE 5 
Amendment applies to investigatory stops such as the stops 
of the vehicles here, United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 
417 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440 (1980); United 
• · States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975), and in 
clear language, prohibits not all searches and seizures, but 
only those that are unreasonable. 
In determining the reasonableness of an investigatory 
stop, the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968), 
adopted a dual inquiry: 
"whether the officer's action was justified at its incep-
tion, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place." 
The Court of Appeals assumed that the police had an articula-
ble and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were 
engaged in marihuana trafficking when they attempted to 
stop the Pontiac and the pickup. 660 F. 2d, at 970. The 
court concluded, however, that the 30 to 40-minute stop of 
Sharpe and the 15-minute stop of Savage "failed to meet the 
[Fourth Amendment's] requirement of brevity." Ibid. 
We need not decide whether the length of Sharpe's deten- 7 
tion was unreasonable, because that detention was wholly un-
related to Agent Cooke's discovery of the marihuana; the 
marihuana was in Savage's pickup, not in Sharpe's Pontiac. 
At issue in this case is whether it was reasonable under the 
circumstances facing Agent Cook and Officer Thrasher to de-
tain Savage, whose vehicle contained the challenged evi-
dence, for 15 minutes. We conclude that Savage's detention 
clearly satisfied the Fourth Amendment's standard of 
reasonableness. 
We note at the outset that when the police stopped re- 1 
spondents they had a reasonable suspicion that respondents 
were engaged in illegal activity. Agent Cooke had observed 
the vehicles travelling in tandem for 21 miles in an area near 
the coast known to be frequented by drug traffickers. The 
pickup truck appeared to be heavily loaded and the windows 
... 
--. 
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of the camper shell were covered. Both vehicles took eva-
sive actions and started speeding when Officer Thrasher be-
gan following them in his marked vehicle. Based on these 
facts, Agent Cooke did not act improperly in stopping re-
spondents to ascertain whether the pickup contained drugs. 
Nor was Savage's 15-minute detention unreasonable under 
the circumstances of this case. Agent Cooke diligently pur-
sued his investigation. During most of Savage's 15-minute 
detention, Cooke was attempting to contact Thrasher and en-
listing the help of the local policemen who remained with 
Sharpe while Cooke left to locate Officer Thrasher and the 
pickup. When Cooke reached Officer Thrasher and Savage, 
he examined the pickup's bill of sale, requested permission to 
search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper of the pickup 
and, noting that the truck did not move, confirmed his suspi-
cion that it was probably overloaded. Cooke then detected 
the odor of marijuana. ~ 
Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to 
the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. 
Respondents have presented no evidence that the law en-
forcement officers were dilatory in their investigation. The 
delay in this case was almost entirely attributable to the eva-
sive actions of Savage, who sought to elude the police as 
Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Absent 
such evasive conduct, only a short and' certainly permissible 
delay would have taken place. The somewhat longer deten-
tion was simply a "graduate[d] ... response[] to the de-
mands of [the] particular situation," United States v. Place, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 10 (1983), and thus satisfied the 
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness. 
In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
assumed that our cases establish a rigid "brevity require-
ment" for investigatory stops based on less than probable 
cause. 660 F. 2d, at 970. Our cases impose no such time 
limitation on Terry stops. While 1t 1s cleartfiat "the brevity 
of the mvas1on onhe 'individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
.. 
; 
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ests is an important factor in determining whether the sei-
zure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reason-
able suspicion," United States v. Place,-- U. S., at--, 
we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforce-
ment purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time 
needed reasonably to effectuate those purposes. I d., at 
--;see United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 20. · As we stated in Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700, n. 12 (1981), "[i]f the purpose 
underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible criminal ac-
tivity-is to be served, the police must under certain circum-
stances be able to detain the individual for longer than the 
brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 
407 U. S. 143 (1972)]." Where the police have acted dili-
gently and the suspects are entirely responsible for the added 
delay about which they complain, we decline to hold that a 15-
minute stop is unreasonable. . 
Because it was lawful to detain Savage for the 15 minutes 
necessary for Agent Cooke to -complete his investigation, the 
District Court properly denied respondents' motion to sup-
press the contraband seized from Savage's vehicle. Accord-
ingly, the petition for certiorari should be granted, the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case should 
again be remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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that were addressed in detail in the original majority and dis-
senting opinions," reasoning that its action complied with this 
Court's mandate. !The panel assumed that "[h]ad [this] 
Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would 
have said so." !d., at 65, n. 1. 
Judge Russell again dissented. Joined by Judges Wid-
ener, Hall and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of en 
bane hearl.ng. In his view, this Court's remand required the 
court to reconsider its conclusion that the detention of re-
spondents was unlawfully prolonged. Addressing the issue, 
he urged that the Court of Appeals' adherence to its prior de-
cision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. ' 
692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account re-
spondents' responsibility for the circumstances that pro-
longed their detention. 712 F. 2d, at 67-69. 
The rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, "it 
must be ai'firnied~ alth-ough-the-l~vV-~r 'Court -~elied-upon a" 
wrong g!"-oun'd or gave a wrong reason." Helvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Therefore, had we con- · 
eluded that one ground for the decision below was infirm 
under Ross but that the alternative ground at issue here ade-
quately supported the judgment, we would simply have de-
nied the petition for certiorari. Instead, we vacated the first 
1 panel decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case 
to that court. Our disposition would have been pointless if ( 
we did not want _the Court or'App.eals to reconsider the mer- i 
its of the issues now before the Court. The Court of Ap_peals ! 
hae-Jall9d -t9 H.eN"En· our direction. Implicit in oilrord.er was 
theorrectiOntoreconSider; ·unot withdraw, the Court of Ap-
peals' alternative holding that the prolonged detention of the 
respondents violated the Fourth Amendment. By refusing ' 
to reconsider this alternative holding, the Court of Appeals 
· · our earlier order. 
--- 1\ 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " The 
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UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE AND 
DONALD DAVIS SAVAGE 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
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No. 83-529. Decided May-, 1984 
PER CURIAM. 
On the morning of June 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration was on patrol in an unmarked 
vehicle near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an area under 
surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approxi-
mately 6:30 a. m., Cooke noticed a blue pickup truck, with an 
attached camper shell, traveling on the highway in tandem 
with a blue Pontiac. Respondent Savage was driving the 
pickup, and respondent Sharpe was driving tile Pontiac. 
Agent Cooke noticed that the truck was riding low in the rear 
and concluded that it was overloaded. A quilted material 
covered the rear window of the camper. 
Agent Cooke was sufficiently concerned to follow the two 
vehicles for 21 miles; he then decided to make an "investiga-
tive stop" and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assist-
ance. Officer Thrasher in a marked patrol car responded to 
the call, and both he and Agent Cooke, in separate vehicles, 
followed the Pontiac and the pickup off the highway, through 
a campground, and back onto the highway. At certain 
times, the Pontiac and the pickup exceeded the speed limit. 
Once back on the highway, Thrasher signalled the driver of 
the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the 
right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and 
Thrasher's patrol car, nearly hitting the _patrol car, and con-
tinued down the highway. 
Agent Cooke stayed with the Pontiac, which had stopped 
at the side of the road. At the agent's request, Sharpe pro-
duced a Georgia driver's license bearing the name of Ray-
~of- s1~ f!,·s /a"\i~ar- a..a- mvch 
k.;t- ~ ~ ~1~ d _S'~, 
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mond Pavlovich. After being unable to make radio contact 
with Thrasher, Cooke radioed local police to come and hold 
Sharpe while he went after Thrasher and the pickup. The 
local police arrived and held Sharpe for 30 to 40 minutes until 
Cooke returned. 
Meanwhile, Thrasher chased the pickup and stopped it 
about one-half mile down the road. After patting down the 
driver, Thrasher asked him for a driver's license. The 
driver, Savage, produced his own Florida driver's license and 
a bill of sale for the truck bearing the name Pavlovich. 
Thrasher told Savage that he was not free to leave and could 
be held on speeding charges. Agent Cooke arrived at the 
scene approximately 15 minutes later and sought permission 
to search the pickup. When Savage denied permission, 
Cooke stepped on the rear of the truck and, noting that it had 
not moved, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably over-
loaded. He then put his nose against the rear window, 
which was covered by a curtain, and reported that he could 
smell marihuana. The agent removed the keys from the ig-
nition, opened the rear of the camper, and observed several 
large burlap-wrapped bales. Cooke arrested Savage and re-
turned to arrest Sharpe. 
Later DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building 
in Charleston, South Carolina. Cooke ordered the bales re-
moved and, without a search warrant, had 8 randomly se-
lected bales sampled. As suspected, chemical tests showed 
that the baled substance was marihuana. 
Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession with in-
tent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 
U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. § 2. The United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina denied re-
spondents' motion to suppress the contraband, and respond-
ents were convicted. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the convictions. 660 F. 2d 967 (1981). The 
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majority assumed that Cooke "had an articulable and reason-
able suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged- in mari-
juanatraificK:irig when he and Thrasher stopped the Pontiac 
and the truck." I d., at 970. But the court held the investi-
gative stops unlawful because they "failed to meet the re-
quirement of brevity" governing such detention on less than 
probable cause. Ibid. Alternatively, the majority held that 
the warrantless search of the bales in government possession 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that 
on either ground the marihuana should have been sup-
pressed. Judge Russell dissented. 
The Government petitioned for certiorari, asking this 
Court to review both of the alternative grounds held by the 
Court of Appeals to justify suppression. 1 We granted the 
petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and 
remanded the case for consideration in light of the interven-
ing decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). 
457 u. s. 1127 (1982).~
On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals again 
reversed the convictions. 712 F. 2d 65 (1983). The major-
ity concluded that, in light of Ross, it was required to "dis-
avow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrantless 
search of the marihuana bales. But, "[f]inding that Ross 
does not adversely affect our primary holding that the initial 
stop of the vehicle and the lengthy detention of the two de-
fendants constituted illegal seizures," the court readopted 
the prior opinion as modified. The majority declined to re-
consider its "principal holding or to reargue the same issues 
'The Government also asked this Court to review the Court of Appeals' 
holding that the marihuana was a fruit of respondents' unlawful detention. 
2 JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICES BRENNAN and MARSHALL, dis-
sented, stating: 
"We held [in Ross] that the scope of a legitimate warrantless search of an 
automobile is defined by the object of the search and the places in which 
there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. The issue pre-
sented in this case is whether a warrantless search was itself legitimate." 
I d., at 1128. 
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that were addressed in detail in the original majority and dis-
. senting opinions," reasoning that its action complied with this 
Court's mandate. The panel assumed that "[h]ad [this] 
Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would 
have said so." I d., at 65, n. 1. 
Judge Russell again dissented. Joined by Judges Wid-
ener, Hall and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of en 
bane hearing. In his view, this Court's remand required the 
court to reconsider its conclusion that the detention of re-
spondents was unlawfully prolonged. Addressing the issue, 
he urged that the Court of Appeals' adherence to its prior de-
cision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 
692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account re-
spondents' responsibility for the circumstances that pro-
longed their detention. 712 F. 2d, at 67--69. 
The rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, "it 
must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a 
wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." H elvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Therefore, had we con-
cluded that one ground for the decision below was infirm 
under Ross but that the alternative ground at issue here ade-
quately supported the judgment, we would simply have de-
nied the petition for certiorari. Instead, we vacated the first 
panel decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case 
to that court. Our disposition would have been pointless if 
we did not want the Court of Appeals to reconsider the mer-
its of the issues now before the Court. The Court of Appeals 
clearly misread our direction. Implicit in our order was the I 
direction to reconsider, if not withdraw, the Court of Ap-
peals' alternative holding that the prolonged detention of the 
respondents violated the Fourth Amendment. By declining 
to reconsider this alternative holding, the Court of Appeals 
failed to com ly with our earlier order. 
he Fourth mendment guaran ees "[t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " The 
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Amendment applies to investi~ such as the stops 
of the vehicles here, Uni:fi(TStates V. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 
417 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440 (1980); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975), and in 
clear language, prohibits not all searches and seizures, but 
only those that are unreasonable. 
In determining the reasonableness of an investigatory 
stop, the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968), 
adopted a dual inquiry: 
"whether the officer's action was justified at its incep-
tion, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place." 
The Court of Appeals assumed that the police had an articula-
ble and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were 
engaged in marihuana trafficking when they attempted to 
stop the Pontiac and the pickup. 660 F. 2d, at 970. The 
court concluded, however, that the 30 to 40-minute stop of 
Sharpe and the 15-minute stop of Savage "failed to meet the 
[Fourth Amendment's] requirement of brevity." Ibid. 
We need not decide whether the length of Sharpe's deten-
tion was unreasonable, because that detention was wholly un-
related to Agent Cooke's discovery~ of the mari~ana; llie 
marihuana was in Savage's pickup, not in Sharpe's Pontiac. 
At issue in this case is whether it was reasonable under the 
circumstances facing Agent Cook and Officer Thrasher to de-
tain Savage, whose vehicle contained the challenged evi-
/1 
dence, for 15 minutes. We conclude that Savage's detention 
clearly satisfied the Fourth Amendment's standard of rea-
sonableness. 
We note at the outset that when the police stopped re-
spondents they had a reasonable suspicion that respondents 
were engaged in illeg~ooke had observed 
the vehicles travelling in tandem for 21 miles in an area near 
the coast known to be frequented by drug traffickers. The 
pickup truck appeared to be heavily loaded and the windows 
6 UNITED STATES v. SHARPE 
of the camper shell were covered. Both vehicles took eva-
sive actions and started speeding when Officer Thrasher be-
gan following them in his marked vehicle. Based on these 
facts, Agent Cooke did not act improperly in stopping re-
spondents to ascertain whether the pickup contained drugs. 
Nor was Savage's 15-minute detention unreasonable under 
the circumstances of this case. Agent Cooke diligently pur-
sued his investigation. During most of Savage's 15-minute 
detention, Cooke was attempting to contact Thrasher and en-
listing the help of the local policemen who remained with 
Sharpe while Cooke left to locate Officer Thrasher and the 
pickup. When Cooke reached Officer Thrasher and Savage, 
he examined the pickup's bill of sale, requested permission to 
search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper of the pickup 
and, noting that the truck did not move, confirmed his suspi-
cion that it was probably overloaded. Cooke then detected 
the odor of marijuana. 
/~ Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to 
{ j the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. 
Respondents have presented no evidence that the law en-
forcement officers were dilatory in their investigation. The 
~1
delay in this case was almost entirely attributable to the eva-
sive actions of Savage, who sought to elude the police as 
Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Absent 
such evasive conduct, only a short and certainly permissible 
delay would have taken place. The somewhat longer deten-
tion was simply a "graduate[d] . . . response[] to the de-
mands of [the] particular situation," United States v. Place, 
--U.S. --, --, n. 10 (1983), and thus satisfied the 
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness. 
In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
assumed that our cases establish a rigid "brevity require-
ment" for investigatory stops based on less than probable 
cause. 660 F. 2d, at 970. Our cases impose no such time 
limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that "the brevity 
of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
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ests is an important factor in determining whether the sei-
zure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reason-
able suspicion," United States v. Place,-- U. S., at--, 
we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforce-
ment purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time 
needed reasonably to effectuate those purposes. I d., at 
--; see United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 20. As we stated in Michigan v. 
Summers , 452 U. S. 692, 700, n. 12 (1981), "[i]f the purpose 
underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible criminal ac-
tivity-is to be served, the police must under certain circum-
stances be able to detain the individual for longer than the 
brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 
407 U. S. 143 (1972)]." Where the police have acted dili-
gently and the suspects are entirely responsible for the added 
delay about which they complain, we decline to hold that a 15-
minute stop is unreasonable. · 
Because it was lawful to detain Savage for the 15 minutes 
necessary for Agent Cooke to complete his investigation, the 
District Court properly denied respondents' motion to sup-
press the contraband seized from Savage's vehicle. Accord-
ingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SHARPE, et al. 
Motion of Respondents for} L/ 
Leave to Proceed Further ~1 
In Forma Pauperis /'-
Also Motion of 
Respondents for Appoint-
ment of Counsel 
SUMMARY: Resps are ~gitives from justice and their ---attorney is unable to contact them. Through motions to proceed 
ifp and for appointment of counsel, the attorney seeks to alert 
the Court to the situation. 
BACKGROUND: Resps were convicted of possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. §84l(a)(l). 
They appealed their conviction, asserting the DC erred by 
failing to suppress contraband found in their possession. The 
~overturned resps' conviction, finding: (a) the 
investigative detention of resps was unlawfully prolonged; 
{b) the contraband was the fruit of the unlawful detention; and 
/ (c) a later, more thorough warrantless search of resps' car was 
illegal. The~ited States petitioned the Court for review of 
the CA 4's decision. 
In 1983, the Court granted cert and remanded the case to 
the CA 4 for reconsideration in light of the Court's recent 
~----------------------------~------------------------------decision regarding warrantless searches (United States v. Ross, 
456 u.s. 798 (1982)). On remand, the CA 4 "disavowed" those ' .. 
portions of its previous decision on the warrantless search of 
resps' car which conflicted with Ross, but reaffirmed its 
holding based on the illegality of the initial investigative 
stop and resps' prolonged detention. The circuit court --
readopted its_g revious OJ2in~~ form and again ~ 
reversed resps' conviction. 
' / 
The government petitioned for cert a second time. On 
June 18, 1984, the Court granted the petition. 
' ·~-------------------On May 11, 1984, while the petn for cert was pending, 
counsel for resps informed the Clerk that Sharpe had failed to 
appear in the DC for a previously scheduled bail review 
hearing. In July 1984, the other resp, Savage, also failed to 
appear. The DC issued bench warrants for resps. 
------------------
In failing to 
appear, resps each forfeited a $50,000 bond and $10,000 on 
deposit with the DC clerk. 
J L 0 
CONTENTIONS: Resps' disappearance places counsel in a 
difficult position. He may have an ethical duty to 
proceed--even without his clients. However, the attorney states 
he does not know the whereabouts of resps and cannot consult 
with his clients concerning their appeal. 
On August 27, 1984, resps' counsel filed a motion to 
proceed ifp and for appointment of counsel. He explains he is 
willing to prepare and argue the case, but would like to at 
least be reimbursed for expenses (i.e., copying costs and air 
fare).~unsel was not appointed below and no affidavit of 
financial need has been filed in support of the motion. Counsel 
requests the Court waive the requirement for such a document in 
this case. 
DISCUSSION: Generally, resps' [fugitive statll1 would 
"disentitle them from calling upon the resources of the Court." 
(Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970).) However, in 
this case, the government has petitioned for cert and an order 
denying the counsel's call for help may undermine the Court's 
efforts to dispose of the case. There are several alternatives 
which may be considered depending on whether the Court feels the 
assistance of counsel will enhance its treatment of the issues. 
A. Summary . Disposition. The Court may wish to 
consider summary disposition in this case. The issues raised by 
the government were before the Court in the previous 
proceeding. At this time, the Court has received the petn for 
cert, resps' opposition, a reply memorandum and the government's 
opening brief. It may be that the issues are adequately 
developed by these filings and additional briefing and/or 
argument would not add to the Court's understanding and 
treatment of the case.l Under these circumstances, the 
appointment of appellate counsel to prepare and argue resps' 
position may be unnecessary and the motion could be denied. 
1If the Court is interested in this alternative, it may 
wish to instruct the Legal Office to prepare a memorandum 
addressing the merits of the petn. 
I 
I 
B. Amicus Counsel. If the Court feels it would 
benefit from further briefing of the issues, it may consider 
appointing amicus counsel to support the circuit court's 
position. Resps' counsel, who is already familiar with the 
case, would be a logical choice. However, the Court need not 
appoint the party's attorney--it could appoint some other 
advocate to support the CA 4's decision. Appointment of new 
counsel would minimize the appearance resps are benefiting from 
their fugitive status. 
The attorney appointed amicus would donate his or her time 
pro bono, but the Court could compensate counsel for expenses 
(i.e., approximately $900.00 for copying the brief and travel to 
Washington, D.C.). A disadvantage of this approach is that the 
Court may not be able to recover these costs from resps if and 
when they are located~ 
C. Conditional IFP. Finally, the Court may wish to 
1 
l consider granting counsel's request for ifp status and an 
appointment under the C~A.on the condition that the costs be 
taxed against resps (if they are located and found to have 
sufficient assets). This would give the Court the benefit of 
counsel's assistance. 
\ 
However, it would also permit resps 
access to the resources of the Court despite their fugitive 
status. 
CONCLUSION: The fugitive status of the criminal-defendant 
resps raises a unique problem. The Court could consider the ---------------petn summarily, appoint amicus counsel or conditionally appoint 
resps' counsel. I recommend that tl1e Court consider summary 
disposition, as this approach does not preclude the other 
alternatives. A careful consideration of summary treatment 
should reveal the need, if it exists, for further briefs and 
argument. 






~rguea .........•..••..•.• , Jl! ••• 





Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
Stevens, J ........................... . 
O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ . 
.tlBStgnea •.....•..••••.••.. , 1 Y . •• 







N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
No. 83-:-529 
ABSENT NOT YOTING 
. ..................... . 
. ..................... . 
November 19, 1984 
SHARPE GINA-POW 
83-529 United States v. Sharpe and Savage(CA4) 
MEMO TO FILE 
This is another case involving "reasonable suspicion 
to stop and questions persons believed to be engaged in 
criminal conduct". The facts are detailed in the opinions 
below and the briefs of the par ties. In summary, the 
facts are as follows: 
DEA Agent Cooke, experienced in drug enforcement 
matters, was on patrol in an unmarked car on a coastal 
road in the vicinity of Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an 
area under surveillance by law enforcement authorities for 
suspected drug trafficing. Cooke followed a pickup truck 
with a "camper shell" traveling together with a blue 
pontiac. Cooke observed that the truck was riding low in 
the rear (apparently overloaded) , and its rear and side 
windows covered from the inside with a quilt material, and 
also that it had taken evasive action by leaving the 
highway and then returning. 
Cooke summoned assistance by radio to which Officer 
Thrasher, in a marked patrol car, responded. Respondents 
in a speed limit zone of 35 miles per hour, attempted to 
elude the officers - first made a "fruitless detour" off 
of the 6-lane highway, and then drove 50 to 60 miles an 
hour before Officer Thrasher signalled both vehicles to 
stop. Savage in the pickup truck, drove between the 
pontiac and Officer Thrasher's patrol car nearly hitting 
the latter, and failed to stop. 
While Thrasher pursued the pickup truck, Agent Cooke 
questioned Sharpe, the driver of the pontiac. The pickup 
truck was overtaken about a half a mile down the highway, 
two local Mirtle Beach police remained with respondent 
Sharpe beside the pontiac, and Cooke joined Officer 
Thrasher and the pickup truck. After unsatisfactory 
questioning, the DEA Agent told Savage (pickup truck 
driver) that he was suspected of transporting marijuana, 
requested permission to search the truck, but Savage 
declined. The DEA Agent, noting that truck still appeared 
to be overloaded, leaned against the rear window of the 
camper top where he smelled "a very strong odor of 
marijuana". Cooke, with keys left in the vehicle's 
ignition, opened the rear door of the camper and observed 
a large number of burlap wrapped bags in which marijuana 
is often transported. Cooke then placed Sharpe and Savage 
(the respondents) under arrest. Later that day, after the 
pickup truck had been taken to the Federal Building in 
Charleston, the DEA agents some three days later 
removed from the truck 43 bales weighing 2600 pounds. 
Acting without a search warrant, the agent opened 8 bales 
at random and withdrew samples for lab analysis. The 
substance was marijuana. 
The Decisions Below 
The DC denied respondents motion to suppress the 
marijuana. The Court of Appeals (Erwin and Winter} 
reversed, with Russell dissenting. The majority (the 
court} - relying on Terry and Br ignoni Ponce (primarily} 
held that the detention of respondents for some 30 to 40 
minutes exceeded the scope of investigation permissible on 
the basis of reasonable suspicion short of probable cause. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that "the length of the 
detentions effectively transformed them into de facto 
arrests without basis and probable cause", and that the 
detentions therefore constituted unlawful seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Judge Russell, in dissent held that in determining 
whether the length of a detention renders a particular 
stop unreasonable, courts must look to the totality of the 





any delay that 
not attributable 
prolonged . 
to the law 
respondents 
enforcement 
officers, but was occasioned primarily by the efforts of 
Savage to avoid being stopped. 
We granted the government petition, vacated the 
judgment of CA4, and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the intervening decision in u.s. 
v. Ross, 456 u.s. 798 (1982). On remand, CA4 (2-1) again 
reversed respondents convictions, concluding that in light 
of Ross it was required to disavow its alternative holding 
disapproving the warrantless search of the marijuana 
bales. But CA4 also concluded that "finding that Ross 
does not adversely affect our primary holding that the 
initial stop of the vehicle and the lengthy detention of 
the two defendants constituted illegal seizures", the 
court readopted the prior opinion as modified. Judge 
Russell agains dissented, arguing primarily that the 
majority's adherence to its prior decision was 
inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 u.s. 692 
(1918), and improperly failed to take into account the 
fact that respondents were themselves responsible for the 
circumstances that prolonged the detention. 
The Parties Positions 
The SG agrees essentially with Judge Russell. The 
SG • s statement of the question indicates rather clearly 
his position: 
"The principal question presented by this 
case concerns the permissiblity under the Fourth 
Amendment of detaining a suspect for a limited, 
but more than momentary, period on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion falling short of probable 
casue, for the purpose of pursuing a 
circumscribed investigation of the suspected 
criminal activity. This question is of great 
practical importance to law enforcement 
authorities. There are a wide variety of 
situations in which it may be advisable, in the 
course of a routine investigatory stop, for an 
officer to detain a suspect beyond the minute or 
two that, in the view of the court of appeals, 
define the outer boundaries of a permissible 
seizure on less than probable cause." 
As examples of the needs of the police to have some 
flexibility under the circumstances, the SG cited the 
situation where a suspect may be detained while the police 
attempt to determine whether a crime has occurred in the 
area or, if a crime is known to have occurred, to enable 
witnesses to view the suspect. See Michigan v. Summers. 
The SG's brief distinguishes Terry, Adams v. Williams, and 
Brignoni Ponce, although recognizing that the stops in 
those cases were quite brief. But the lenght of a 
detention is not necessarily controlling depending upon 
the circumstances. The SG argues that the correct 
approach is the "standard of reasonableness embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment", citing Summers: 
"If the purpose underlying a Terry stop -
investigating possible criminal activity - is to 
be served, the police must under certain 
circumstances be able to detain the individual 
for longer than the brief time period involved 
in Terry and Adams." 
Respondents argue that they were under "de facto" 
arrests for up to 40 minutes. They state the issue 
presented in simplicity terms: 
"The issue presented is whether the investigatory 
stop made pursuant to Terry v. Ohio was converted into an 
unlawful arrest by the duration of the stop and the 
subsequent actions of the officers. The length of the 
detentions "transformed them into de facto arrests without 
basis and probable cause. An essential element of a Terry 




This case presents an interesting question. It is 
certainly true that in our prior "investigative stop" 
cases we have emphasized the brevity of the detention. 
Yet, in none of these prior cases was there a law 
enforcement need comparable to that presented by this 
case, for long detention of the suspects. In Br ignoni-
Ponce for example, the stops were made at a highway check 
point and only when there was suspicion of illegal aliens 
in the vehicle was it pulled aside - not for a search -
but merely for brief questioning. Here, although the 
detention extended over a substantial period of time (up 
to 40 minutes), much of this was occasioned wholly by 
efforts of the respondents to avoid the initial stop. 
Also the flight of Savage is significant. 
Judge Russell makes a reasonable argument in saying 
that the standard should be whether the investigative 
detention was "reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances". The SG supports this view although in 
somewhat different language. His brief states that in 
determining whether a seizure less intrusive than 
traditional arrest is permissible, "it is necessary to 
consider the reasonableness of the seizure in light of all 
the surrounding circumstances". The SG does not 
particularly emphasize Judge Russell's point that one of 
important circumstances in this case was the flight of 
Savage and the time required to overtake him, and for 
.. , 
Officer Cooke to join the state trooper who had caught up 
and stopped Savage. 
The case is certainly important for law enforcement. 
I am inclined to reverse, but recognize the difficulty of 
identifying a standard that would not require factual 
determinations in considerable detail in every case. Yet, 
a "bright line" or per se rule based only the duration of 
the investigative stop hardly seems reasonable. 
As I understand the issues, and am familiar with the 
case, I do not need a bench memo. A brief summary of my 
clerk's view of how this case should be analyzed would be 
welcome. 





TO: Justice Powell 
EROM: Lee 
ffi: No. 83-529, United States v. Sharpe, et al. (C.A4-J 
I agree with your tentative conclusion that the judgment 
of CA4 should be reversed. The court implied that investigatory 
stops based on "reasonable suspicion" could never last longer 
than a couple of minutes. Judg~n stated that he could not~ 
I 
think that CA4's analysis is flawed; under some circumstances, 
mvestigatory stops lasting longer than a few minutes are 
reasonable. 
In Michigan v. Summer , 452 u.s. 693 (1981), the Court 
held that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable 
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain 
I l ,--
an occupant of the premises while a proper search is conducted. 
The Court held that this detention is reasonable even if the 
police lack probable cause to arrest the occupant. In reaching 
its conclusion, the Court recognized that the exceptions to the 
probable cause requriement were "not confined to the momentary, 
on the street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons 
involved in Terry and Adams." The Summers Court stated that in 
deciding whether other exceptions were justified, it is necessary ~~~. 
to examine both the character of the official intrusion and its - ----7 
justification. 
/ 
In United States v. Place, 51 USLW 4844 (1983), the 
Court again indicated that detentions lasting longer than a 
moment were sometimes reasonable, even in the absence of probable 
cause. In that case, a suspected drug courier was held for 90 
minutes so that his luggage could be sniffed by a specially 
crained dog. The Court held that the detention was unreasonable 
in that case. The Court noted that the police officers knew that 
~e suspect was going to be arriving on a particular flight: 
therefore, they could have had the trained dogs waiting at the 
airport, so as to minimize the length of the detention. The 
Court was careful to state, however, that it was not adopting any 
"outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop. The 
length of a detention certainly was a factor, but it was not 
determinative. -~ummers and Place indicate that the CA erred in adopting 
a per se rule. The "totality of the circumstances" approach 
.....__---..... 
suggested by 
such a test, 
his dissent is preferable. Under ~ 
the investigatory stop was reasonable. 
DEA agent Cooke was by himself when he spotted the two suspicious 
vehicles. When he decided that it would be necessary to stop the 
cruck and the Pontiac for brief questioning, he enlisted the aid 
of a state trooper, Thrasher. The law enforcement officers 
intended to stop both vehicles in the same place, thereby 
facilitating the questioning of the drivers. The driver of the 
cruck, however, decided not to pull over. Therefore, while Cooke 
remained with the driver of the car, Thrasher chased the truck 
about one-half mile down the road. 
Through no fault of the law enforcement officers, the 
drivers of the two vehicles were separated by one-half mile. 
~though Cooke probably wanted briefly to question the two 
suspects together, that option was foreclosed by Sharp's evasive 
action. Agent Cooke then undertook to question briefly Sharpe, 
the driver of the automobile. No one contends that this initial 
qJestioning of Sharpe was so long as to be unreasonable. After 
finishing with Sharpe, Agent Cooke could not leave the suspect 
unattended while he went down the road to question Savage. 
Therefore, he had to wait a few more minutes for reinforcements 
from the local police department. As soon as the reinforcements 
arrived, Agent Cooke proceeded down the road for his second round 
of questioning. Once he reached the truck, Cooke questioned 
Savage only briefly before it became clear that there was 
marijuana was in the truck. In summary, the actual questioning 
of both suspects was brief, no longer than the questioning 
permitted in cases such as Brignoni-Ponce. The time of detention 
was prolonged solely because one of the two suspects took evasive 
action. 
I think that the action taken by Agent Cooke was 
reasonable. The only way that the total detention time could 
have been shortened would have been to transport one of the 
suspects to the location of the other. Arguably, this would have 
involved a much greater intrusion than the one involved here. 
Therefore, this case is unlike Place, where the officers were not 
"diligent" in limiting the scope of the intrusion. 
It is difficult to come up with a standard for 
determining when reasonable suspicion may justify the detention 
of a suspect for more than a few minutes. The "totality of the 
circumstances" test does not provide police officers with much 
guidance. Nevertheless, there are two factors that seem 
especially relevant to the inquiry. First, if the suspect is 
detained where he is stopped, the seizure is less intrusive than 
if he is transported somewhere else, particularly a police 
station. Second, the diligence of the police officer is 
relevant. The court should consider whether the policeman could 
mve made the seizure less intrusive and still accomplish his 
goals. In this case, both of these factors suggest that the 
search was reasonable. Furthermore, here the law enforcement 
officer wanted to question the suspects only briefly, but was 
frustrated in that effort by the actions of the one of the 
suspects. Although this consideration has relatively limited 
applicability outside of the facts of this case, it might be 
dispositive here. 
I recommend that the judgment of CA4 be reversed. ?' ~ 
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SUPR COURT OF THE UNITED STATES f~ 
No. 83-529 
UNITED TATES, PETITIONER v. WILLIAM HARRIS 
SH RPE AND DONALD DAVIS SAVAGE 
' l ~/ON WRIT 0 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
~ - - - APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
~ ~ [December-, 1984] 
!Sf .,j_ CHI BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
~/ _ .AjJ ~ _ Co e granted certiorari to decide whether an individual rea-
~"'r (\. sonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be de-
tained for a period of 20 minutes, when the detention is nee-
~ ~. _,Jo-/ essary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited 
~- { ~ investigation of the suspected criminal activity. 
l v I 
A 
12-/11 _.. 2- 0 
On the mo~ne 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) was on patrol in an un-
marked vehicle on a coastal road near Sunset Beach, North 
Carolina, an area under surveillance for suspected drug traf-
ficking. At approximately 6:30 a. m., Cooke noticed a blue 
pickup truck with an attached camper shell traveling on the 
highway in tandem with a blue Pontiac Bonneville. Re-
spondent Savage was driving the pickup, and respondent 
Sharpe was driving the Pontiac. The Pontiac also carried a 
passenger, Davis, the charges against whom were later 
dropped. Observing that the truck was riding low in the 
rear and that the camper did not bounce or sway appreciably 
when the truck drove over bumps or around curves, Agent 
Cooke concluded that it was heavily loaded. A quilted mate-
rial covered the rear and side windows of the camper. 
T ~ ·W ~ j~ 1t:.~ Of'~av, • .I !1/;A, -h:..J fi-.J 
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Cooke's suspicions were sufficiently aroused to follow the 
two vehicles for approximately 20 miles as they proceeded 
south into South Carolina. He then decided to make an "in-
vestigative stop" and radioed the State Highway Patrol for 
assistance. Officer Thrasher, driving a marked patrol car, 
responded to the call. Almost immediately after Thrasher 
caught up with the procession, the Pontiac and the pickup 
turned off the highway and onto a campground road. Cooke 
and Thrasher followed the two vehicles as the latter drove 
along the road at 55 to 60 miles an hour, exceeding the speed 
limit of 35 miles an hour. The road eventually looped back to 
the highway, onto which Savage and Sharpe turned and con-
tinued to drive south. 
At this point, all four vehicles were in the middle lane of 
the three right-hand lanes of the highway. Agent Cooke 
asked Officer Thrasher to signal both vehicles to stop. 
· Thrasher pulled alongside the Pontiac, which was in the lead, 
turned on his flashing light, and motioned for the driver of 
the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the 
right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and 
Thrasher's patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and con-
tinued down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck 
while Cooke pulled up behind the Pontiac. 
Cooke approached the Pontiac and identified himself. He 
requested identification, and Sharpe produced a Georgia 
driver's license bearing the name of Raymond J. Pavlovich. 
Cooke then attempted to radio Thrasher to determine 
whether he had been successful in stopping the pickup truck, 
but he was unable to make contact for several minutes, ap-
parently because Thrasher was not in his patrol car. Cooke 
radioed the local police for assistance, and two officers from 
the Myrtle Beach Police Department arrived about 10 min-
utes later. Asking the two officers to "maintain the situa-
tion," Cooke left to join Thrasher. 
In the meantime, Thrasher had stopped the pickup truck 
about one-half mile down the road. After stopping the 
83-529---0PINION 
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truck, Thrasher had approached it with his revolver drawn, 
ordered the driver, Savage, to get out and assume a "spread 
eagled" position against the side of the truck, and patted him 
down. Thrasher then holstered his gun and asked Savage 
for his driver's license and the truck's vehicle registration. 
Savage produced his own Florida driver's license and a bill of 
sale for the truck bearing the name of Pavlovich. In re-
sponse to questions from Thrasher concerning the ownership 
of the truck, Savage said that the truck belonged to a friend 
and that he was taking it to have its shock absorbers re-
paired. When Thrasher told Savage that he would be held 
until the arrival of Cooke, whom Thrasher identified as a 
DEA agent, Savage became nervous, said that he wanted to 
leave, and requested the return of his driver's license. 
Thrasher replied that Savage was not free to leave at that 
time. 
Agent Cooke arrived at the scene approximately 15 min-
utes after the truck had been stopped. Thrasher handed 
Cooke Savage's license and the bill of sale for the truck; 
Cooke noted that the bill of sale bore the same name as 
Sharpe's license. Cooke identified himself to Savage as a 
DEA agent and said that he thought the truck was loaded 
with marihuana. Cooke twice sought permission to search 
the camper, but Savage declined to give it, explaining that he 
was not the owner of the truck. Cooke then stepped on the 
rear of the truck and, observing that it did not sink any 
lower, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably over-
loaded. He put his nose against the rear window, which was 
covered from the inside, and reported that he could smell 
marihuana. Without seeking Savage's permission, Cooke 
removed the keys from the ignition, opened the rear of the 
camper, and observed a large number of burlap-wrapped 
bales resembling bales of marihuana that Cooke had seen in 
previous investigations. Agent Cooke then placed Savage 
under arrest and left him with Thrasher. 
83-529-0PINION 
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Cooke returned to the Pontiac and arrested Sharpe and 
Davis. Approximately 30 to 40 minutes had elapsed be-
tween the time Cooke stopped the Pontiac and the time he 
returned to arrest Sharpe and Davis. Cooke assembled the 
various parties and vehicles and led them to the Myrtle 
Beach police station. That evening, DEA agents took the 
truck to the Federal Building in Charleston, South Carolina. 
Several days later, Cooke supervised the unloading of the 
truck, which contained 43 bales weighing a total of 2629 
pounds. Acting without a search warrant, Cooke had 8 ran-
domly selected bales opened and sampled. Chemical tests 
showed that the samples were marihuana. 
B 
Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute it in violation of 21 
U. S.C. §841(a)(1) (1982) and 18 U.S. C. §2 (1982). The 
United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina denied respondents' motion to suppress the contraband, 
and respondents were convicted. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the convictions. 660 F. 2d 967 (1981). The 
majority assumed that Cooke "had an articulable and reason-
able suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in mari-
juana trafficking when he and Thrasher stopped the Pontiac 
and the truck." I d., at 970. But the court held the investi-
gative stops unlawful because they "failed to meet the re-
quirement of brevity" thought to govern detentions on less 
than probable cause. Ibid. Basing its decision solely on the 
duration of the respondents' detentions, the majority con-
cluded that "the length of the detentions effectively trans-
formed them into de facto arrests without bases in probable 
cause, unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment." 
Ibid. The majority then determined that the samples of 
marihuana should have been suppressed as the fruit of re-
spondents' unlawful seizures. I d., at 971. As an alterna-
83-529-0PINION 
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tive basis for its decision, the majority held that the warrant-
less search of the bales taken from the pickup violated 
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981). Judge Russell 
dissented as to both grounds of the majority's decision. 
The Government petitioned for certiorari, asking this 
Court to review both of the alternative grounds held by the 
Court of Appeals to justify suppression. We granted the pe-
tition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and re-
manded the case for further consideration in the light of the 
intervening decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 
(1982). 457 u. s. 1127 (1982). 
On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals again 
reversed the convictions. 712 F. 2d 65 (1983). The major-
ity concluded that, in the light of Ross, it was required to 
"disavow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrant-
less search of the marihuana bales. But, "[f]inding that Ross 
does not adversely affect our primary holding" that the de-
tentions of the two defendants constituted illegal seizures, 
the court readopted the prior opinion as modified. Ibid. 
The majority declined "to reexamine our principal holding or 
to reargue the same issues that were addressed in detail in 
the original majority and dissenting opinions," reasoning that 
its action complied with this Court's mandate. The panel as-
sumed that "[h]ad [this] Court felt that a reversal was in 
order, it could and would have said so." Id., at 65, n. 1. 
Judge Russell again dissented. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and we 
reverse. 1 
1 We granted certiorari on June 18, 1984. On August 27, counsel for re-
spondents notified the Court that respondents had become fugitives. · On 
October 1, we directed counsel for respondents to file a brief as amicus cu-
riae in support of affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment. Because 
our reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment may lead to the reinstate-
ment of respondents' convictions, respondents' fugitive status does not ren-
der this case moot. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,- U. S. 
-, -, n. 2 [103 S. Ct. 2573, 2576, n. 2] (1983); Molinaro v. New Jer-
sey, 396 U. S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam) . 
I 
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II 
As a threshold matter, we consider it important to note 
that the Court of Appeals misread our remand. It is a set-
tled rule of appellate review that, "if the decision below is 
correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied 
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." Helvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Had we concluded that 
the alternative ground for the decision below was infirm 
under Ross but that the primary ground adequately sup-
ported the judgment, there would have been no occasion for a 
remand; we would simply have denied the petition for certio-
rari. Instead, we vacated the first panel decision of the 
Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court. That 
disposition would have been pointless had we not contem-
plated that the Court of Appeals was to reconsider the merits 
of the issue now before the Court. Implicit in our order was 
the direction to reexamine, if not withdraw, the Court of Ap-
peals' holding that the detentions of the respondents violated 
the Fourth Amendment. In declining to reconsider this 




The Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee 
against all searches and seizures, but only against unreason-
able searches and seizures; the Constitution does not require 
the government to show that a challenged action was reason-
able, but only that it was not unreasonable. The authority 
and limits of the Amendment apply to investigative stops of 
vehicles such as occurred here. United States v. Cortez, 449 
U. S. 411, 417 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 663 
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878, 
880 (1975). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we adopted 
a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investi-
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"whether the officer's action was justified at its incep-
tion, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place." I d., at 20. 
As to the first part of this inquiry, the Court of Appeals 
assumed that the police had an articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in mari-
huana trafficking, given the setting and all the circumstances 
when the police attempted to stop the Pontiac and the 
pickup. 660 F. 2d, at 970. That assumption is abundantly 
supported by the record. 2 As to the second part of the in-
quiry, however, the court concluded that the 30- to 40-minute 
detention of Sharpe and the 20-minute detention of Savage 
"failed to meet th~ourth-Amendment's] requirement of 
brevity." Ibid. 
It is not necessary for us to decide whether the length of 
Sharpe's detention was unreasonable, because that detention 
bears no causal relation to Agent Cooke's discovery of the 
marihuana. The marihuana was in Savage's Rickup, not in 
Sharpe's Pontiac; tile contraoand' ffitroduced at responaents' 
trial canno£ lOi ·call be considered the "fruit" of Sharpe's de-
tention. he onl issue in this case then, is whether it was 
reasonable un er t e circumstances facing Agent Cooke and 
Officer Thrasher to detain Savage, whose vehicle contained 
the challenged evidence, for approximately 20 minutes. We 
' Agent Cooke had observed the vehicles traveling in tandem for 20 
miles in an area near the coast known to be frequented by drug traffickers. 
Cooke testified that pickup trucks with camper shells were often used to 
transport large quantities of marihuana. App. 10. Savage's pickup truck 
appeared to be heavily loaded, and the windows of the camper were· cov-
ered with a quilted bed-sheet material rather than curtains. Finally, both 
vehicles took evasive actions and started speeding as soon as Officer 
Thrasher began following them in his marked car. Perhaps none of these 
facts, standing alone, would give rise to a reasonable suspicion; but taken 
together as appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer, they pro-
vided clear justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited 
investigation. 
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conclude that the detention of Savage clearly meets the 
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness. 
The Court of Appeals did not question the reasonableness 
of Officer Thrasher's or Agent Cooke's conduct during their 
detention of Savage. Rather, the court concluded that the 
length of the detention alone transformed it from a Terry 
stop into a de facto arrest. Counsel for respondents, as ami-
cus curiae, assert that conclusion as their principal argument 
before this Court, relying particularly upon our decisions in 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); Florida v. 
Royer, - U. S. - [103 S. Ct. 1319] (1983); and United 
States v, Place, - U. S. - [103 S. Ct. 2637] (1983). 
That reliance is misplaced. 
In Dunaway, the police picked up a murder suspect from a 
neighbor's home and brought him to the police station, 
where, after being interrogated for an hour, he confessed. 
The state conceded that the police lacked probable cause 
when they picked up the suspect, but sought to justify the 
warrantless detention and interrogation as an investigative 
stop. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the 
defendant's detention was "in important respects indistin-
guishable from a traditional arrest." 442 U. S., at 212. 
Dunaway is simply inapposite here: the Court was not con-
cerned with the length of the defendant's detention, but with 
events occurring during the detention. 3 
In Royer, government agents stopped the defendant in an 
airport, seized his luggage, and took him to a small room used 
for questioning, where a search of the luggage revealed nar-
cotics. The Court held that the defendant's detention consti-
3 The pertinent facts relied on by the Court in Dunaway were that (1) 
the defendant was taken from a private dwelling; (2) he was transported 
unwillingly to the police station; (3) he there was subjected to custodial in-
terrogation resulting in a confession; and (4) the questioning concerned a 
crime known to have had occurred five months earlier, whereas a Terry 
stop typically involves suspected criminal activity that is imminent or on-
going or haf!_ just occurred. 
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tuted an arrest. See-- U. S., at-- [103 S. Ct., at 1327] 
(plurality opinion); id., at -- [1330] (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); id., at-- [1330] (BRENNAN, J., concurring in there-
sult). As in Dunaway, though, the focus was primarily on 
facts other than the duration of the defendant's detention-
particularly the fact that the police confined the defendant in 
a small airport room for questioning. 
The plurality in Royer did note that "an investigative de-
tention must be temporary and last no longer than is neces-
sary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." -- U. S., at 
-- [103 S. Ct., at 1325]. The Court followed a similar ap-
proach in Place. In that case, law enforcement agents 
stopped the defendant after his arrival in an airport and 
seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics de-
tection dog for a "sniff test." We decided that an investiga-
tive seizure of personal property could be justified under the 
Terry doctrine, but that "[t]he length of the detention of re-
spondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the 
seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause." 
-- U. S., at --/ [103 S. Ct., at 2645]. However, the ra-
tionale underlying that conclusion was premised on the fact 
that the police knew of respondent's arrival time for several 
hours beforehand, and the Court assumed that the police 
could have arranged for a trained narcotics dog in advance 
and thus avoided the necessity of holding respondent's lug-
gage for 90 minutes. "[I]n assessing the effect of the length 
of the detention, we take into account whether the police dili-
gently pursue their investigation." Ibid.; see also Royer, 
- U. S., at- [103 S. Ct., at 1325]. 
Here, the Court of Appeals did not conclude that the police 
acted less than diligently, or that they unnecessarily pro-
longed Savage's detention. Place and Royer thus provide no 
support for the Court of Appeals' analysis. 
Admittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place, consid-
ered together, may in some instances create difficult line-
drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop 
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from a de facto arrest. Obviously, if an investigative stop 
continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justi-
fied as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid 
time limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that "the 
brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests is an important factor in determining whether the 
seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on rea-
sonable suspicion," United States v. Place, -- U. S., at 
-- [103 S. Ct., at 2645], we have emphasized the need to 
consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the 
stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those 
purposes. !d., at-- [2642-2643, 2645]; Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U. S. 692, 700, and n. 12 (1981) (quoting 3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, at 36-37 (1978)). Much as 
a "bright line" rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether 
an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense 
and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid 
criteria. 
We sought to make this clear in Michigan v. Summers, 
supra: 
"If the purpose underlying a Terry sto_Ir-investigating 
possible criminal activity-is to be served, the police 
must under certain circumstances be able to detain the 
individual for longer than the brief time period involved 
in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 
(1972)]." 452 U. S., at 700, n. 12. 
Later, in Place, we expressly rejected the suggestion that 
we adopt a hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible Terry 
stop: 
"We understand the desirability of providing law en-
forcement authorities with a clear rule to guide their 
conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a 
rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the 
equally important need to allow authorities to graduate 
their responses to the demands of any particular situa-
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tion." -- U. S., at--, n. 10 [103 S. Ct., at 2646, 
n. 10]. 
The Court of Appeals' decision would effectively establish a 
per se rule that a 20-minute detention is too long to be justi-
fied under the Terry doctrine. Such a result is clearly and 
fundamentally at odds with our approach in this area. 
B 
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to 
be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropri-
ate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means 
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their sus-
picions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S., at 
701, n. 14 (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, at 
40 (1978)); see also Place, - U. S., at- [103 S.Ct, at 
2645]; Royer,- U. S., at-. [103 ~· Ct., at 1325]. 
Agent Cooke diligently pursued his investigation. During 
most of Savage's 20-minute detention, Cooke was attempting 
to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the local police 
who remained with Sharpe while Cooke left to pursue Officer 
Thrasher and the pickup. Once Cooke reached Officer 
Thrasher and Savage, he proceeded expeditiously: within the 
space of a few minutes, he examined Savage's driver's license 
and the truck's bill of sale, requested (and was denied) per-
mission to search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper and 
noted that the truck did not move, confirming his suspicion 
that it was probably overloaded. He then detected the odor 
of marijuana. 
Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to 
the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. 
Respondents presented no evidence that the officers were 
dilatory in their investigation. The delay in this case was 
attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of Savage, 
who sought to elude the police as Sharpe moved his Pontiac 
to the side of the road. Except for Savage's maneuvers, 
.. 
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only a short and certainly permissible pre-arrest detention 
would likely have taken place. The somewhat longer deten-
tion was simply the result of a "graduate[ d) ... response[] to 
the demands of [the] particular situation," Place,-- U. S. 
at -, n. 10 [103 S. Ct., at 2646, n. 10]. 
We reject the contention that a 20-minute stop is unreason-
able when the police have acted diligently and a suspect's ac-
tions contribute to the added delay about which he complains. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is · reversed, and the 
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